Banburismus and the Brain: Decoding the Relationship between Sensory Stimuli, Decisions, and Reward named after the town of Banbury where they printed special sheets of paper that allowed them to carry out the computations that were central to this process. In the second section, we apply this framework to simple, two-alternative decisions on response-time perceptual of an Enigma machine, which included interchangeable A decision is reached when the evidence reaches a rotors and a modifiable plugboard, determined which threshold value. In the codebreaking scheme, the of over a billion billion encoding schemes was being threshold determined the speed and accuracy of the used at any given time. Even more cunningly, the configdecision process. Here we propose that in the brain, uration of the machine changed for each character it the threshold may be controlled by neural circuits that encoded, so that knowing the identity of one encoded calculate the rate of reward.
ters-a great virtue of the machine to its users. Morekind of analysis, decisions in Turing's Banburismus scheme were made by considering how much weight over, two machines that were in different configurations (i.e., h 0 ) had equally random outputs. Such machines, of evidence they needed to collect (in the form of matched and non-matched pairs) to be confident that encoding two different messages, thus produced pairs of characters that would be expected to match each one hypothesis has been sufficiently proven. Specifically, they considered two "barriers" to bookend the other only as often as two letters picked independently from uniform distributions of all 26 letters, which is equal process of accumulating decibans; one was a positive number describing the weight of evidence needed to to a rate of 1/26. However, if two machines happened to be in the same configuration (h 1 ), the situation is quite decide h 1 , the other a negative number describing the weight of evidence needed to decide h 0 . When the different. In this case, even when encoding different messages, the two machines would produce pairs of weight of evidence crossed either barrier, the decision was made. A similar formulation for statistical applicacharacters that matched each other if (and only if) the letters they encoded also matched each other. Theretions was developed independently by Wald shortly after the war (Wald, 1947). fore, the expected "match rate" from the encoded messages would be the same as that from the unencoded As Turing was aware, this formulation had two distinct advantages. First, it had a definite stopping time that messages, which is equal to ‫31/1ف‬ in ordinary German text. In other words, the likelihood of getting a match instructed the codebreaking team when to stop working on one pair of ciphers and turn their attention to another. (m ) given h 1 , denoted Pr(m|h 1 ), was greater than the likelihood of getting a match given h 0 , denoted Pr(m|h 0 ).
Second, it predicted the accuracy of the decision, as follows. By Bayes' theorem, the weight of evidence can Accordingly, Turing defined the weight of evidence provided by a match (or, similarly, a non-match) in favor of h 1 be related to several other probabilities: over h 0 as the logarithm of the ratio of these likelihoods: log ΄ where Pr(h 0 |m) and Pr(h 1 |m) are called the posterior probabilities and describe the probability of each hyAs a logarithm of probabilities, this quantity is measured pothesis after all the evidence has been sampled, and in units that depend on the base of the logarithm (Good, Pr(h 0 ) and Pr(h 1 ) are called the prior probabilities and 1979). In Banburismus, logarithms of base 10 were used describe the probability of each hypothesis before any and were called "bans" (the Banburismus process actuevidence is sampled. If, for example, there is an equal ally computed weights of evidence in units of 1/10 th of prior probability of either hypothesis (which was the a ban-a deciban-that the codebreakers considered assumption made in Banburismus), then the weight of to be "about the smallest weight of evidence that is evidence is equal to the logarithm of the ratio of the directly perceptible to human intuition"; Good, 1979). posterior probabilities. In this case, for a given weight Likewise, logarithms of base e were called "natural of evidence (e.g., the stopping point in Banburismus): bans." It is worth noting that other, closely related quantities that are based on the logarithm of probabilities log ΄
Pr(h 1 |m)
Pr(h 0 |m) ΅ ϭ weight of evidence ϭ B (3) can be measured in the same units. Thus, "surprisal" and "mutual information" can be expressed in bans but where B is a constant that represents the barrier height are more familiar in units that use a logarithm of base in favor of h 1 . For two mutually exclusive hypotheses 2: "bits."
(Pr(h 0 |m) ϭ 1 Ϫ Pr(h 1 |m) or, equivalently, Pr(h 0 ) ϭ 1 Ϫ A quantity based on the logarithm of probabilities has Pr(h 1 )), and assuming the weight of evidence is exanother useful feature: additivity. Writing over 100 years pressed in bans, this rearranges to: ago about the degree of "belief" in a hypothesis that is provided by the evidence, Pierce noted that "two Pr(h 1 |m) ϭ 1 1 ϩ 10 ϪB .
(4) arguments which are entirely independent, neither weakening nor strengthening each other, ought, when they concur, to produce a belief equal to the sum of the Equation 4 indicates that the posterior probability of h 1 depends only on the value of the barrier, B, and not on intensities of belief which either would produce separately" (Peirce, 1878). Equation 1 fulfills this requirement, the particular samples of evidence, m, encountered. In other words, as long as the weight of evidence reaches such that the weight of evidence provided by two independent sources is equal to the sum of the weights of B bans, the probability that h 1 is correct is a fixed value. Thus, in Banburismus, setting the height of the barrier evidence that they provide individually. Thus, for Turing, the overall weight of evidence for h 0 or h 1 that was prothat determined the weight of evidence to accumulate before committing to a decision was equivalent to setvided by all the corresponding pairs of letters in two given messages could be computed by counting the ting an expected level of performance. For example, accumulating matches and non-matches until the number of matches and non-matches, then simply adding up the weight of evidence provided by each. weight of evidence reached 2 bans would provide approximately 100 to 1 odds that the decision was correct. This tally of matches and non-matches was a form of sequential analysis, in which the overall weight of Of course, the greater the weight of evidence required, the more time the codebreaker must spend on each evidence bearing on the hypotheses under consideration is updated given each new piece of evidence (in message. It is this critical feature of the decision rule, explicitly linking the interpretation of the evidence to the this case, the next pair of letters 
and . Thus, neural activity in these areas represents the encoded, noisy evidence that the brain where must interpret to decide which hypothesis was most probable. Pr(x,y|h 0 ) ΅ a random variable: for a given set of stimulus conditions (e.g., upward motion), it has an expected value but can
Relating Sensory Signals to Turing's Weight of Evidence
· (x Ϫ y) (6) vary considerably from moment-to-moment or trial-totrial. Thus, the neural response can take on numerous values, each with a certain probability. These probabiliNote that numerous factors could cause nonzero values of , including intrinsic factors like attention and arousal ties can be estimated by taking repeated measurements of the response of a neuron (or group of neurons) to a and extrinsic factors like the light level or other variations in the stimulus. For example, for the motion-discriminastimulus and generating a curve describing the distribution of responses to that stimulus. The height of such tion task, motion in a given direction is typically presented at a variety of strengths (i.e., h 0 and h 1 each a curve at a given spike rate for a given stimulus (e.g., (7) strengths). Because x and y both depend on motion strength, they are not independent: a strong stimulus where k is a constant. Note that if k does not equal the constant of proportionality in Equation 6, then the value that would tend to produce a relatively large value of x would also tend to produce a relatively small value of that is computed is merely proportional to the weight of evidence. Regardless of the value of k, however, the y. Equation 6 indicates that such a dependence between x and y does not alter the fact that the difference (x Ϫ algorithm for updating the weight of evidence is the same: accumulate the difference in spike rates over y ) is proportional to the weight of evidence.
Thus, under a variety of assumptions, the weight of time. As illustrated in Figure 2 , this temporally accumulating evidence can be thought of as simply a single evidence can be computed by taking a simple difference between the responses of two opposing neurons. The piece of evidence that lends more weight to the decision as more time passes. obvious advantage of this scheme is the simplicity of the computation. A potential pitfall is that it appears to Thus, as in Turing's scheme, an accumulated difference of opposing sensory responses in the brain correrequire a constant of proportionality that depends on the parameters of the distributions describing the responds to the weight of evidence that can distinguish between the alternative hypotheses. For equal prior sponses; e.g., 0 , 1 , , and in Equation 6. However, as we discuss in the following sections, combining multiple probabilities, the value of this decision variable is particularly easy to interpret: zero implies that both hypothepieces of evidence does not necessarily require the constant of proportionality to be known. Moreover, the ses are equally probable, an increasingly positive value implies a growing probability that one of the hypotheses choice of an appropriate decision rule can, in principle, bypass the need to scale the weight of evidence approis correct, and an increasingly negative value implies the alternative (Equation 2). It should be noted that the priately. Making Use of All of the Evidence decision variable can, in principle, take into account many other factors and still distinguish between the In Banburismus, multiple pieces of evidence-the matched and non-matched pairs of characters from the hypotheses in such a straightforward manner. These factors include sensory evidence from multiple sources, two messages-were combined by adding together the weight of evidence computed from each pair individuunequal prior probabilities, and anticipated costs and benefits associated with the potential outcomes (Graally. The resulting quantity, called a decision variable, was the sole factor used to make the decision. Recall ham, 1989; Green and Swets, 1966). How these complicated and in some cases subjective factors are comthat a critical advantage of this computation was that the value of the decision variable determined the level puted in the brain is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, we will simply assume that the decision variable of performance. In this section, we describe how the brain might compute a similarly useful decision variable.
reflects the posterior probabilities as if it were computed as an accumulation of evidence from a single source Consider a case in which the sensory evidence comes from the ongoing responses from the neuron/antineuron and equal prior probabilities. As we describe in the next section, a particularly useful consequence of this aspair. A single "piece" of evidence can be thought of as representing the difference in spike rates at a given sumption is that it implies a close relationship between the decision rule and the rate of reward. moment in time. As more time goes on, more evidence is available. If the responses are independent and identi-
The Decision Rule Here we consider a decision rule that places barriers cally distributed over time, then accumulating the evidence corresponds to a temporal integration of the difon the value of the decision variable. In Banburismus, the height of the barriers represented a trade-off beference in spike rates: ric function describing the probability of correctly reaching either the "up" or "down" barrier on a given trial is: To illustrate this idea, we will focus on a reaction-time version of the direction-discrimination task, in which the subject is allowed to control the amount of time to make
a response (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002). The sensory evidence is a difference signal from visual cortex. We which, like Equation 4, is the logistic function (here using assume that the difference is a random variable that is base e ). Unlike in Equation 4
, however, the probability drawn from a normal distribution with a variance of one correct in this function depends on not just the barrier and a mean value that depends on the strength of motion height B, but also a coherence-dependent term, i . This (measured as a percentage of coherently moving dots, extra term is to account for the coherence-dependent which typically takes values of 0, 3.2, 6.4, 12.8, 25.6, scale factor that relates the weight of evidence to the and 51.2). Upward and downward motion strengths are difference signal that reaches B (Equation 6). Specifiassigned positive and negative means, respectively. We cally, a fixed B corresponds to a smaller weight of evialso assume that there are equal prior probabilities of dence for lower coherences (i.e., weaker signals) than upward and downward motion (that is, both are prefor higher coherences (stronger signals). The mean time sented with equal frequency). The decision process is to reach the barrier is: simply to accumulate the difference (in 1 ms steps) until it reaches a threshold of evidence, ϮB. If the evidence reaches ϩB, the decision is upward (see Figure 2) ; if it For simplicity in the following calculations, we assume adjustment could be accomplished by a process of trial-and-error, in which the barrier is raised and lowered until the maximum rate of reward is achieved. Interestingly, in this case, the constant of proportionality that relates the accumulated difference (x Ϫ y) to the weight of evidence is not needed to find the barrier height that leads to the maximum rate of reward. That information is not lost, however: once the barrier height is fixed, it corresponds to a particular level of overall performance and thus can be expressed in units of the weight of evidence, such as natural bans. Note that this quantity is not the weight of evidence that would be calculated based on knowledge of the stimulus motion strength and the associated sensory response distributions because that information would lead to perfect performance at all motion strengths. Rather, it is the weight of evidence that corresponds to a fixed level of uncertainty across all stimulus strengths in an experiment (this quantity will tend to overestimate the evidence from weak stimuli and underestimate the evidence from strong stimuli). Accordingly, the evidence that accumulates during a trial can be interpreted as a fraction of this quantity and thus in units of natural bans-even when the scaling between the decision variable and the weight of evidence is not known (e.g., if the brain does not know the shapes of the sensory response distributions).
To summarize, we have described a decision variable 
Neurophysiology: Banburismus in the Brain
In this section, we briefly review experimental evidence supporting the idea that a neural implementation of a form of Banburismus is responsible for generating catedecision. Performance accuracy on this task was similar to that found on fixed-duration versions of the task. gorical decisions about sensory stimuli. We focus first on a recent study of neural activity in the lateral intrapaResponse times were, as expected, inversely related to accuracy: more difficult (lower motion strength) trials rietal area (LIP) measured during a reaction-time version of the direction-discrimination task (Roitman and Shadtook longer than less difficult trials. Correlates of this motion strength-and time-dependent decision process len, 2002). Results from that study provide the clearest example to date of neural mechanisms that appear to were found in the activity of single neurons in area LIP. In a given experiment, they recorded from an LIP neuron correspond to the key features of Banburismus, including the accumulation of sensory evidence to a threshold and arranged the task so that one of the two choice targets was located in that neuron's response field. They value. We then consider the general properties of neurons that may implement a process like Banburismus then sorted trials in terms of whether the monkey's eyemovement response was into or out of the neuron's to form perceptual decisions.
The study by Roitman and Shadlen (2002) The second property of these circuits is that they tual decisions: the ability to link sensory evidence to motor intention. That is, there seems to be a close relaappear to be sensitive to psychological factors that can affect the underlying decision variable. A particularly tionship in the brain between forming a categorical decision and planning behavior. Neurons that form categoricompelling example comes from area LIP, where both the prior probability of getting a reward and the expected cal decisions accumulate sensory (and other) evidence that bears on hypotheses. If, as in Banburismus, the magnitude of the reward have been shown to modulate neural activity related to a visually guided saccade task evidence is accumulated to a threshold value, then reaching that value implies that the decision process (Platt and Glimcher, 1999) . Prior probabilities can similarly affect the activity of neurons in the superior collicuis over and the brain is committed to a proposition. Typically, the proposition is linked to some behavior that lus (Basso and Wurtz, 1998; Dorris and Munoz, 1998). In addition, regions of the lateral prefrontal cortex and is then permitted to ensue. Thus, it is convenient to think about the threshold for commitment as a shift from the orbitofrontal cortex have been shown to represent information related to the value and probability of an sensory analysis to behavioral intention. For this reason, it is natural to consider the process of accumulating anticipated reward in the context of sensory-motor tasks (Hikosaka and Watanabe, 2000; Leon and Shadevidence to threshold in terms similar to sensorimotor integration. For example, the brain regions that appear len, 1999; Schultz, 1999, 2000; Watanabe, 1996) . Mechanisms responsible for shifting selective atto represent the developing direction decision on the motion-discrimination task-including area LIP, the tention may also help to shape the decision variable, possibly by controlling the scale factor that determines FEF, and the superior colliculus-are known also to play a role in preparing the associated eye-movement rethe weight of evidence provided by a given set of sensory neurons. Indeed, attentional modulation is a central sponse (Schall, 1991) .
It should be emphasized that this idea about the role feature of sensory-motor transformation signals in association areas of cortex (Colby and Goldberg, 1999; Desiof action-oriented circuits in decision formation does not imply that decisions must be coupled with overt mone and Duncan, 1995). The third property suggested by the framework we behavioral responses. At least some of these circuits may be able to interpret sensory information in a more have presented is that decision-making circuits in the brain are likely to access information about accuracy general, "pragmatic" framework that tary eye field appears to represent an evaluation of performance on sensory-motor tasks, including whether a In addition to representing the transformation of sensory information into intention, many of these actiontask was completed successfully and whether a reward was obtained (Stuphorn et al., 2000) . Neurons in a region oriented circuits possess several other properties that
